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Abstract
Following tournament theory, incentives will be rather low if the contestants of
a tournament are heterogeneous. We empirically test this prediction using a
large dataset from the German Hockey League. Our results show that indeed the
intensity of a game is lower if the teams are more heterogeneous. This eect can
be observed for the game as a whole as well as for the first and last third. When
dividing the teams in the dataset into favorites and underdogs, we only observe
a reduction of eort provision from favorite teams. As the number of games
per team changes between dierent seasons, we can also investigate the eect of
a changing spread between winner and loser prize. In line with theory, teams
reduce eort if the spread declines. Interestingly, eort is also sensitive to the
total number of teams in the league even if the price spread remains unchanged.
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1 Introduction
The focus of this paper is to investigate the eect of heterogeneity between the
contestants on eort provision in a tournament. A large dataset of the German
Hockey League is used to test the theoretical predictions made by tournament
theory. We analyze this eect for the whole game and also for each third sep-
arately. Furthermore, we test if favorites and underdogs behave dierently in a
tournament. Our last research question is if a change of the prize spread aects
eort provision in hockey.
Tournament situations are a common occurrence in business and even day-
to-day life. Be it two agents competing for a job promotion (see Baker, Gibbs
& Holmström (1994)) or a higher share in bonus pools (see Rajan & Reichel-
stein (2006)). One can observe salesman who are compensated based on relative
performance (see Murphy, Dacin & Ford (2004)) and election tournaments be-
tween politicians (see Gersbach (2009)). Firms compete in R&D contests (see
Zhou (2006)) as well as patent rights competitions (see Waerneryd (2000)) while
singers fight for the first prize in singing contests (see Amegashie (2009)). Fur-
thermore, sports contests like basketball, soccer or hockey have the structure of
tournaments.
Lazear & Rosen (1981) have shown that eort levels in tournaments depend
on several parameters. The spread between the winner and the loser prizes, the
number of participants as well as the heterogeneity of the contestants, to name
the most important ones, all influence the agents’ eort choices. For example
it is rather intuitive that agents exert more eort if the prize spread is high
as has been shown for instance by Ehrenberg & Bognanno (1990a), Ehrenberg
& Bognanno (1990b) and Heyman (2005). Furthermore as Nalebu & Stiglitz
(1983) and McLaughlin (1988) have shown,the prize spread has to rise with an
increased number of participants. Experimental evidence regarding the number
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of participants and heterogeneous tournaments comes from Orrison, Schotter &
Weigelt (2004). For an overview on contests and tournaments see Konrad (2009).
But how does heterogeneity influence the eort levels? If we consider a tour-
nament with perfectly homogeneous agents, it is fairly obvious that the ex ante
chances of winning are equal for all participants. The incentives to work are there-
fore high, since no agent has an advantage. However, in real world tournament
situations, contestants are often rather heterogeneous. Since eort is costly, the
underdog will reduce his eort compared to the homogeneous case, as his winning
probability is smaller due to his handicap. The higher the disadvantage of the
underdog, the stronger this eect. The favorite will anticipate this behavior and
can consequentially reduce his eort without endangering his favorable position.
In a heterogeneous tournament both agents will therefore exert lower eort levels
compared to the homogeneous case.
While this eect is well documented in the theoretical literature (see for ex-
ample O’Keee, Viscusi & Zeckhauser (1984) and Kräkel & Sliwka (2004)) and
properly examined with experimental data (see Bull, Schotter & Weigelt (1987)
or Harbring & Luenser (2008)), only few papers investigate this topic with real
life data. Hence, empirical evidence regarding this - in the real world common -
situation is still sparse.
We extend the existing literature by investigating tournaments between het-
erogeneous teams in the German Hockey League. These data are well suited for
analysis as hockey tournaments provide the two key features which are essential
to all tournament models. First, only the relative performance determines who
wins a given game. The absolute performance compared to e.g. preceding games
is irrelevant since only the number of scored goals in the game decides which
team wins. Second, the prizes have been fixed in advance. The number of points
awarded for a win has been fixed prior to the season. Additionally, the number
of points is independent of the winning margin.
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For our analysis, we use data from the German Hockey League encompassing
the three seasons from 2006/07 to 2008/09. Our data show that teams commit
less infractions if the ex ante heterogeneity measured by the dierences between
winning probabilities derived from betting odds is higher. This result also holds
for the first and the last third of each game while heterogeneity has no significant
impact on penalties during the second third. We also observe that teams in the
role of the favorite are sensitive to heterogeneity while underdogs generally do
not react to ex ante heterogeneity. However, a deeper analysis reveals that this
pattern is only true if the home team is the favorite. If the visiting team is
the favorite, both teams do not adjust eort to ex ante heterogeneity. Our last
research question is if we observe less penalties when the spread between winner
and loser prize is lower. We can analyze this by comparing season 2006/07 to
season 2007/08. In season 2007/08 the number of games per team was higher,
since one team joined the league. Hence, a single game in season 2007/08 lead to a
lesser percentage of all reachable points than a single game in the previous season.
In line with theory, teams received less penalties in season 2007/08 per game. The
league was joined by another team in season 2008/09 and then encompassed 16
teams. However, due to a revised schedule, all teams played 52 games in season
2008/09 as they did in the first season 2006/07. Therefore the prize spread
(percentage of all reachable points) remained unchanged. Hence, we should not
observe dierent behavior regarding penalties when comparing those two seasons.
Interestingly, our data show that teams committed significantly less penalties in
season 2008/09 than in season 2006/07.
Papers related to our work are from Sunde (2009), Bach, Prinz & Gürtler
(2009) and Frick, Gürtler & Prinz (2008). Using data from professional ten-
nis, Sunde (2009) provides evidence that heterogeneity of players in elimination
tournaments reduces the average number of games won per set. Furthermore,
heterogeneity has a negative impact on games won per set for underdogs while
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it aects the behavior of the favorite to a smaller extent. In his study ranking
lists are used as a heterogeneity measure. However, ranking lists or standings do
not contain all available information about the players since e.g. recent injuries
or suspensions (in team sports) are not included. Bach, Prinz & Gürtler (2009)
investigating data from the Olympic Rowing Regatta 2000 use the achieved tour-
nament stage as a proxy for heterogeneity. In contrast to Sunde (2009), they
report that favorites hold back eort in heterogeneous situations, whereas under-
dogs do not adjust their eort when competing with dominant opponents. While
the first observation is in line with theory, the latter contradicts the theoretical
prediction. Bach, Prinz & Gürtler (2009) argue that underdogs - following the
Olympic spirit - always give their best in Olympic contests. Closest to the paper
at hand are Frick, Gürtler & Prinz (2008) who analyze data from the German
soccer league. They use betting odds to measure heterogeneity and penalties as
a proxy of eort, an approach also pursued in the present paper. In contrast
to soccer, penalties in hockey are rather common, therefore providing a better
database. Additionally, our study goes beyond Frick, Gürtler & Prinz (2008) as
we also analyze each individual period of the game as well as the behavior of
ex ante favorites and underdogs separately. This enables us to shed some light
into the questions if the ex ante heterogeneity influences the whole game or only
the first period and if underdogs and favorites behave dierently in team sports.
Besides, our data feature a kind of natural experiment as the number of teams
and the spread between winner and loser prize vary between the seasons. Hence,
we also analyze the eect of a changing prize spread on eort provision between
dierent seasons.
As hockey is a team sport our paper is also related to the literature about
collective tournaments and group contests (see Drago, Garvey & Turnbull (1996)
and Gürtler (2008)). In contrast to two-player tournaments free-riding can be an
issue in collective tournaments. However, as all teams have equal size on ice this
5
eect is not relevant for our research question.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The dataset is described
in the next section while we derive our hypotheses and explain our empirical
setting in section 3. We present the results in section 4 and conclude the paper
in section 5.
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2 The Data
Hockey, in the American meaning of the word, is a team sport played on an ice
rink. Two teams on ice skates compete for who scores more goals. To score a goal
the teams have to direct the puck, a small black hard disk of vulcanized rubber,
into their opponent’s goal using sticks made of wood or nowadays carbon fiber.
A regular game comprises of three periods. Each third has a net playing time
of 20 minutes. The breaks between the first and the second and between the
second and the third period last 15 minutes. In case of a tied game after the
regulation, a five minute overtime is played in sudden death modus. If neither of
the two teams is able to score in the overtime the game is decided by a shootout.
Each team is allowed to name up to 20 outfield players and 2 goalkeepers for
a particular game. Out of those players on the roster, six players (normally five
outfield players and one goalkeeper) are playing at any given time during the
game. Changing is unlimited and allowed at any time as long as only a total of
six players are on the ice at the same time.
Hockey is a very fast and therefore physical sport. Nevertheless, some physical
actions are prohibited and others are only allowed if they are carried out in a non-
dangerous matter. The most common penalties are called for minor infractions.
They cover actions like high-sticking, tripping or hooking which are meant to
interrupt the opponent’s flow of the game. The oending player is sent to the
penalty bench for two minutes. His team is not allowed to replace this player and
therefore has a disadvantage by playing short handed. Major penalties result in
a five minute penalty time handled accordingly. They are called for infractions
which are more severe instances of minor penalties or are potentially dangerous
to the health of the attacked player. In addition, players can or, depending on the
severity of the infraction, must be punished with a misconduct penalty. A player
penalized with a misconduct penalty is not allowed to play for 10 or 20 minutes,
while his team is allowed to substitute him. It is worth emphasizing that, contrary
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to the NHL, consensual fighting is prohibited in the German Hockey League, and
normally leads to minor penalties plus ten minute misconduct penalties for both
fighting players.1
For the empirical analyses in chapter 4, we retrieve the o!cial game report
sheets for the three seasons from 2006/07 to 2008/09. The raw data are avail-
able from the German Hockey League (DEL). From those we extract detailed
information per game like, amongst others, the names of the playing teams, the
number of goals per third, number of spectators, numbers and causes of penalties
and the names of the game o!cials. We add information about the venue and
calculate travelling distances and standing tables for both teams prior to every
game. Furthermore, we retrieve information on the betting odds from a betting
information website.
The dataset encompasses 364 games (14 teams) in season 2006/2007, 420
games (15 teams) in 2007/08 and 416 games (16 teams) in 2008/2009. In total
we therefore have information on 1200 games of which three games are dropped
due to missing information or premature cancellation. While the teams played
a pure quadruple round robin tournament in the first two seasons, a special
quadruple round robin tournament was established in the last season to limit the
number of games per team.
Since there is no relegation in the DEL, the 14 teams from the first sea-
son played throughout the whole observation period. In 2007/08 as well as in
2008/09 one more team joined the league. This leaves us with 160 observations
for each of the 14 original teams, 108 observations for the 2007/08 addition and
52 observations for the team joining in 2008/2009.
1 This is only a brief description of hockey to lay ground for understanding the empirical
analyses. For more details on hockey see e.g. the rulebook of the IIHF or any national
hockey league.
8
3 Hypotheses and Empirical Setting
The following analyses focus on the eects of heterogeneity on eort provision in
the premier league of German hockey. According to the two-player tournament
model which has been developed by Lazear & Rosen (1981), ex ante heterogeneity
leads to reduced eort of both contestants. It is fairly obvious that a larger initial
disadvantage of the underdog will reduce his incentives to exert eort, as it is
more costly (in terms of eort) for him to compensate his handicap. Given this
behavior, the favorite can reduce his eort level as well without compromising
his position. For a formal model see Lazear & Rosen (1981) or Frick, Gürtler &
Prinz (2008).
To test this theoretical prediction we have to find proxies for eort and het-
erogeneity of the contestants. Regarding eort one could suspect that goals or
shots at goal might be a good proxy. However, both not only depend on the "of-
fensive" eort of one team but also on the "defensive" eort of the other team.
Hence, a game with many goals or shots at goal can be due to the good oen-
sive performance of one team (indicating high eort) or a bad defensive eort
of the opposing team (indicating low eort) (see Frick, Gürtler & Prinz (2008)
for a similar reasoning regarding soccer). Therefore, we expect the number of
two minute penalties to be a better measure of eort in hockey. Those minor
penalties are called for lesser infractions like tripping or high-sticking. If a game
is very intense there are more infractions as the players are more likely to act
slightly against the rules. Of course, detected infractions of the rules are costly
for a team. Nevertheless, those infractions lead to benefits such as destroying the
opposing team’s scoring opportunity or protecting the star players of the team
(see Levitt (2002)).
We use winning probabilities of the respective team instead of standings to
measure heterogeneity of teams because standings do not contain information
about injuries or suspension of top players. The winning probabilities can be
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calculated from the retrieved betting odds. This additional information about
injuries or suspensions is incorporated into betting odds by bookmakers and gam-
blers. In a sense odds and hence winning probabilities have similar qualities as
stock quotations in financial markets (see Fama (1970) and Woodland & Wood-
land (1994)). We measure heterogeneity as the absolute dierence between the
winning probability of the home team and the winning probability of the visiting
team. If this dierence is high, the heterogeneity is high, too. Hence, our first
hypothesis is:
H1: If the heterogeneity of two competing teams is high, we
will observe a rather low number of 2 minute penalties.
We are the first who not only investigate the eect of heterogeneity on the
game as a whole but also for each third separately. As the ratio of the winning
probabilities is a proxy for the ex ante heterogeneity of the competing teams, we
expect the eect of this dierence to be strongest in the first third of the game.
After the first period, both teams might have developed a better feeling for the
physical performance of their opponents which can be measured by the goals after
the previous third.
H2: Over the course of the game, the heterogeneity derived
from the winning probabilities becomes less important.
We expect the goal dierence after the previous third to
be a better measure of heterogeneity for the second and
the last third of the game.
Following theory, both teams should reduce eort if the ex ante heterogeneity
(measured by winning probabilities) is high. Hence, both the favorite and the
underdog should receive less penalties.
H3: Both favorites and underdogs will receive less penalties
if the heterogeneity is high.
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It is quite obvious that eort in a tournament will decline if the spread between
winner and loser prize is smaller. In our dataset the teams play more games in
the second season than in the first and the third season. Hence, in some sense,
the value of winning a single game is smaller in the second season than it is in the
other two seasons. A single game in the first and the third season yields 1=92%
of all reachable points. But in the second season only 1=79% of all points can be
won in a single game.
H4: If the number of games rises we expect the 2 minute
penalties to decline in each game.
Obviously, the method of choice for the statistical analyses of the proposed
hypotheses is a count data regression. As reasoned before, only the number of
minor penalties is used as a measure of eort. The dependent variable therefore
can only take natural numbers including zero. As can be seen from table 1,
the minimum for the dependent variable is 2 while the maximum value is 36>
leaving us with at most 35 distinct values. Because of the discrete nature of the
dependent variable, a linear regression seems inappropriate.
Furthermore, table 1 shows the variance of the number of two minute penal-
ties to be considerably higher than their mean. This observation holds for the
games in whole as well as for each individual third. To account for the observed
overdispersion we choose the Negative Binomial Regression over the more com-
mon Poisson Regression (as reference see e.g. Winkelmann (2008)).2 For the
negative binomial distribution the first two moments of a nonnegative random
variable \ are given by
H [\ | > ] = >
Y [\ | > ] =  (1 + )
2 In this paper the formulation of the negative binomial distribution commonly known as
NB2 is used.
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where the parameter  5 R+ equals the expected value of \ and  5 R+ is an
overdispersion parameter. From the estimated means and variances we therefore
are able to retrieve an estimate for the overdispersion parameter. For the games
in whole we obtain for example b = 0=0411.
Mean Variance Minimum Maximum
Total Game 14=6525 23=3825 2 36
1= Period 5=0359 5=5246 0 15
2= Period 5=1161 6=4940 0 18
3= Period 4=5004 6=8522 0 16
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the number of 2 minute penalties.
The negative binomial distribution is characterized by its probability function
S (\ = n | >) = 
¡
31 + n
¢
 (31) (n + 1)
µ 31
31 + 
¶31 µ 
31 + 
¶n
with >  5 R+ and n 5 N0 where  (·) denotes the gamma integral.
The estimation model specifies the conditional mean of \ as a log-linear
function of x and  using the mean function or regression
H [\l | xl] = exp
¡
x
0
l
¢
>
where xl is a (n × 1) vector of explanatory variables and  a (n × 1) parameter
vector. The log-likelihood can be easily constructed out of the preceding two
equations. The estimation of  then can be achieved using maximum likelihood
method (see e.g. Cameron & Trivedi (2001)).
The last feature of the data we have to take into account to conduct a sound
statistical analysis, is the present panel structure. Since we observe 16 teams
over three seasons, we have to control for the unobservable heterogeneity of the
individual teams. Obviously the usage of a fixed eect model is appropriate since
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the abilities of the teams have an eect on the independent variables and therefore
the individual eects are correlated with the independent variables. To eliminate
the individual eects, we use a two-way fixed eects model to control for both
the home and the visiting team. As Allison & Waterman (2002) pointed out, the
fixed eects negative binomial regression model proposed by Hausman, Hall &
Griliches (1984) is not a true fixed eects regression model. Since this model is
widely incorporated into statistical packages (see e.g. Allison (2009)) we achieve
a two-way fixed eects negative binomial regression by incorporating dummies
for home and visiting teams into the regressions.
Despite the fact that all publicly available information should be contained in
the winning probabilities, we add some additional independent variables. These
variables are supposed to catch other factors that might influence the dependent
variable like e.g. the atmosphere and the quality of the game.
We control for the quality of a given game by adding the goals scored by the
home and the visiting team into the regression. As the atmosphere strongly de-
pends on the number of spectators, we also include the total number of spectators
and the square. However, the venues have dierent capacities ranging from 4> 500
to 18> 500. Therefore, we also include the occupation of the venue as a control
variable.
The geographic distance between two teams has a strong eect on the rivalry
between those teams. Teams that are geographically close often have a stronger
rivalry. For this reason we control for the distance between the home venues of
the respective teams3.
Furthermore, it might be that some referees and linesmen are more lenient
than others. Therefore, we use dummy variables to control for referees and lines-
men.4 Since the game o!cials are known prior to the game one might argue that
3 For an overview over team locations see figure 1 and table A1 in the appendix.
4 Some of the top games in season 2008/2009 have been attended by two referees. We do not
control for those games as already Levitt (2002) has shown that a second referee has only
little eect on the probability of punishment in the NHL.
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information regarding their leniency is already incorporated into the winning
probabilities. On the other hand more lenient o!cials just lead to less penalties
for both teams which does not change the winning probabilities of the teams.
Since our data clearly exhibit dierences between the average numbers of penal-
ties dierent o!cials assign per game, we follow the second arguing and therefore
control for those eects.
Mean Variance Minimum Maximum
Winning Probability
Home Team 0=4741 0=0133 0=1448 0=7866
Visitor Team 0=3266 0=0111 0=0961 0=6919
Dierence 0=2076 0=0273 0 0=6904
Goals
Home Total 3=3968 3=3600 0 11
Home 1= Period 0=9925 1=0241 0 6
Home 2= Period 1=2322 1=1935 0 6
Home 3= Period 1=0643 1=0134 0 7
Visitor Total 2=8530 2=8546 0 11
Visitor 1= Period 0=8312 0=7909 0 5
Visitor 2= Period 1=0033 0=9649 0 6
Visitor 3= Period 0=9206 0=8474 0 5
Crowd & Distance
Spectators (in 1000) 5=8334 12=1736 1=0840 18=5000
Occupancy 0=6592 0=0488 0=2182 1=0000
Distance (in 100km) 2=9758 2=1645 0=1500 5=8500
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the independent variables.
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4 Results
We start by analyzing the key question of this paper whether heterogeneity has
an impact on eort. The results of the respective regression for the game as a
whole are reported in column (1) in table 3.
2 Minute Penalties Total (1) First (2) Second (3) Third (4)
Heterogeneity
(di. win. prob.)
0=2020WW
(0=0813)
0=3350WWW
(0=1290)
0=1110
(0=1290)
0=4310WWW
(0=1510)
Goals Home
(after current third)
0=0217WWW
(0=0049)
0=0531WWW
(0=0135)
0=0280WWW
(0=0093)
0=0297WWW
(0=0090)
Goals Visitor
(after current third)
0=0014
(0=0052)
0=0191
(0=0156)
0=0054
(0=0104)
0=0076
(0=0097)
Season 07/08
0=1100WWW
(0=0302)
0=1080WW
(0=0480)
0=1060WW
(0=0476)
0=1020W
(0=0564)
Season 08/09
0=1770WWW
(0=0359)
0=1570WWW
(0=0574)
0=1530WWW
(0=0567)
0=2140WWW
(0=0670)
Constant
2=7780WWW
(0=6670)
0=1840
(1=1400)
1=9190
(1=2420)
2=2660W
(1=3660)
Obs. 1197 1197 1197 1197
Pseudo-R2 0=0543 0=0465 0=0470 0=0425
Standard errors in parentheses, WWWs?0=01> WWs?0=05> Ws?0=10=
Table 3: Negative binomial regressions for the number of 2 minute
penalties in the whole game and each third separately with the
dierence between winning probabilites as heterogeneity measure.
The full table including variables for spectators, occupancy and
distances between team locations can be found in table A2 in the
appendix. Controls for home teams, visiting teams, referees and
linesmen are included but not reported.
The coe!cient of heterogeneity is negative and significant, hence eort (mea-
sured as 2 minute penalties) is lower in the whole game if the teams are more
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heterogeneous (measured as absolute dierence between winning probabilities)
ex ante. This result is perfectly in line with the theoretical prediction from tour-
nament theory. Hence, our data support hypothesis H1.
To investigate if the ex ante heterogeneity is less important over the course
of the game, we first divide our dataset and estimate the eect separately for
each third (see table 3 columns (2)  (4)). As we have expected, we observe
a highly significant eect of heterogeneity on eort in the first third while the
coe!cient for the second third is not significant. However, we also observe a
significant influence of heterogeneity on eort in the last third. Hence, the ex
ante heterogeneity has an impact on eort provision in the whole game as well
as in the first and last third.
We have argued that the goal dierence after the previous third may be a
better measure of heterogeneity in the second and last third of the game than
the ex ante proxy given by winning probabilities. Therefore, for the regressions
reported in table 4 we use dummies for dierent goal dierences. We include a
dummy for rather low dierences of one or two goals, one dummy for intermediate
dierences of three to four goals and one dummy for rather high dierences (five or
more goals). Our reference group are homogeneous games with a goal dierence
of zero after the previous third.
As we can see in column (1) of table 4, in the second third a small dierence of
one to two goals has a significant negative impact on eort which occurs in roughly
60% of the games. A higher dierence does not aect eort in the second third.
The first observation is clearly in line with theory: If teams are heterogeneous
(have a goal dierences of more than zero), they reduce their eort and commit
less infractions in the second third. Hence, our data support hypothesis H2 for
the second third.
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2 Minute Penalties Second Period (1) Third Period (2)
1 - 2 Goals Dierence
(after previous third)
0=0812WWW
(0=0296)
0=0660
(0=0411)
3 - 4 Goals Dierence
(after previous period)
0=0158
(0=0614)
0=1170WW
(0=0526)
 5 Goals Dierence
(after previous period)
0=2710
(0=2080)
0=2920WWW
(0=0929)
Goals Home
(after current period)
0=0297WWW
(0=0097)
0=0193WW
(0=0095)
Goals Visitor
(after current period)
0=0058
(0=0105)
0=0075
(0=0096)
Season 07/08
0=1110WW
(0=0475)
0=109W
(0=0562)
Season 08/09
0=1580WWW
(0=0566)
0=2180WWW
(0=0669)
Constant
2=0410W
(1=2390)
2=2220
(1=3640)
Obs. 1197 1197
Pseudo-R2 0=0487 0=0431
Standard errors in parentheses, WWWs?0=01> WWs?0=05> Ws?0=10=
Table 4: Negavite binomial regressions for the number of 2 minute
penalties with goal dierence as heterogeneity measure. The full
table including variables for spectators, occupancy and distances
between team locations can be found in table A3 in the appendix.
Controls for home teams, visiting teams, referees and linesmen are
included but not reported.
The picture changes in the last third which is reported in column (2) of table
4. Here, rather low dierences of one or two goals have no significant impact
on eort provision. However, if the dierence is rather high (more than 2 goals
dierence which occurs in 20=72% of the cases), eort rises. This observation is
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not in line with theory. We would expect both teams to receive less penalties if
the goal dierence was high after the second third. Note that this result does
not change even if we control for the ex ante heterogeneity (see table A4 in the
appendix). It is puzzling that ex ante heterogeneity has a significant negative
impact on penalties in the last third while rather high goal dierences after the
second third have the opposite eect on penalties. Therefore, rather high goal
dierences before the last third do not serve as a measure of heterogeneity here.
When controlling for ex ante heterogeneity, our results show that games between
teams which are ex ante equally heterogeneous will lead to more penalties if the
goal dierence after the second third is high.
Since these results are not covered by tournament theory, alternative reason-
ings are necessary. One possible explanation might be that the presumably losing
team might get frustrated. A goal dierence of two or more goals after the second
period shows a clear dominance of the leading team. The trailing team might
get frustrated about its inferiority and this frustration entices it to commit more
infractions.
Another possible explanation takes the conditional winning probability after
the second third into account. As Gill (2000) and Nieken & Stegh (2009) show
for dierent sport leagues worldwide, the conditional winning probability after
the second period for a team which has to catch up more than two goals is rather
small. For the German hockey league Nieken & Stegh (2009) find an average
value of 0> 4750%. Hence, the trailing team might accept its defeat and try to cut
its losses. Even though the absolute goal dierence is irrelevant in tournament
theory, in real life the extent of the defeat clearly is of a certain importance. For
once, the clearer the defeat, the bigger the embarrassment for the losing team.
Furthermore, the number of goals received in a season might become the decision
criterion about who is ranked higher if two or more teams reach identical point
scores at the end of the season. Hence, we might observe more infractions in such
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games since the losing team switches to a strategy of averting additional goals
against at any cost.
A third possible explanation considers that a team consists of individual play-
ers. Those players have their own objectives, primarily to maximize their own
market value. In normal situations, winning the game is the best the players can
do to increase their own market value. For this reason the players exert eort
to win as a team. But in situations in which the loss of the team is more or
less apparent, individual players might switch to another strategy to maximize
their personal statistic. If we consider a defense player, his performance is mainly
judged on his ability to circumvent goals. Committing an infraction can be an
eective way to stop goals against and therefore represents a proper way for him
to conduct his job. If the probability of winning is rather low, a defense player
therefore might try to stop goals against by any means. Even if he is penalized
for his actions, he benefits since goals scored in this time are not attributed to
him. On the other hand the forwards of the leading team might see a good
chance to improve their scoring statistic. They therefore increase pressure on the
other team which in return leads to more penalties against the already struggling
trailing team.
Next we split our dataset and estimate the regressions for favorites and un-
derdogs separately5. While regression (1) reports the eect of heterogeneity on
eort for the favorite, regression (2) gives the results for the underdog in table
5. We see that only the favorite adjusts eort to heterogeneity. If teams are
in a highly superior position (according to winning probabilities), they reduce
their eort provision even though underdogs do not react to heterogeneity. Our
results are in line with the findings of Bach, Prinz & Gürtler (2009) but contra-
dict the findings of Sunde (2009), as in tennis tournaments underdogs are more
sensitive regarding heterogeneity than favorites. The experimental results for ef-
5 Note that we have to drop three games because the winning probabilities are equal for both
contestants.
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fort reduction or dropping out of underdogs in asymmetric tournaments are also
mixed. While Bull, Schotter & Weigelt (1987) report that in their experiment
the mean eort level of disadvantaged subjects was higher than equilibrium ef-
fort, Fershtman & Gneezi (2009) show that quitting may depend on the relation
of tournament incentives and social costs of quitting. Regarding our setting in
hockey the social costs of reducing eort might be higher for underdogs as those
teams are the presumable losers of the match.
2 Minute Penalties Favorite (1) Underdog (2)
Heterogeneity
(di. win. prob.)
0=3260WWW
(0=1170)
0=1350
(0=1060)
Goals Favorite
0=0149WW
(0=0065)
0=0020
(0=0068)
Goals Underdog
0=0074
(0=0072)
0=0196WWW
(0=0062)
Season 07/08
0=0915WW
(0=0408)
0=1170WWW
(0=0385)
Season 08/09
0=1580WWW
(0=0488)
0=2060WWW
(0=0464)
Constant
2=1830WW
(0=8760)
1=9660WW
(0=9010)
Obs. 1194 1194
Pseudo R2 0=0587 0=0558
Standard errors in parentheses, WWWs?0=01> WWs?0=05> Ws?0=10=
Table 5: Negative binomial regressions for the number of 2 minute
penalties for favorites and underdogs separately. The full table in-
cluding variables for spectators, occupancy and distances between
team locations can be found in table A5 in the appendix. Controls
for home teams, visiting teams, referees and linesmen are included
but not reported.
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If we further distinguish between being a favorite at home or being a favorite
away, we observe an interesting pattern (see table 6). If the home team is the
favorite (which is very likely due to home advantage), heterogeneity has a signifi-
cant and negative impact on the eort of the favorite (see column (1) in table 6).
As we have already seen in table 5, the visiting team in the role of the underdog
does not adjust eort (see column (4) of table 6). In contrast if the visiting team
is the favorite, both teams do not react to heterogeneity (see columns (2) and
(3) in table 6). Hence, only if the home team is the favorite, those teams react
according to our expectations of hypothesis H3.
Let us now first look at the games where the home team is the underdog. Given
this constellation the respective home teams might not reduce eort because they
do not want to perform badly and try to give their best in front of their fans in
order to avoid negative social costs.
The economic eect of the home crowd is not modeled in standard tournament
theory. However, teams need the financial support of their fans and the money
raised from entrance fees and merchandising. Therefore, not reducing eort as
an underdog may have purely economic reasons for the home team as home and
visiting teams may have dierent tournament prizes. The opposing team might
anticipate this behavior and choose to not adjust eort either. If the home team
is the favorite, our results show reduced eort. The team can aord to commit a
smaller number of infractions as it is already in a favorable position and therefore
likely to win the game at home. Still, it remains puzzling why the visiting team
does not adjust eort.
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Favorite Underdog
2 Minute Penalties Home (1) Visitor (2) Home (3) Visitor (4)
Heterogeneity
(di. win. prob.)
0=2620W
(0=1480)
0=3180
(0=3920)
0=0209
(0=3930)
0=0366
(0=1380)
Goals Home
0=0187WW
(0=0078)
0=0432WWW
(0=0166)
0=0157
(0=0172)
0=0233WWW
(0=0071)
Goals Visitor
0=0011
(0=0086)
0=0038
(0=0143)
0=0098
(0=0148)
0=0063
(0=0079)
Season 07/08
0=0865W
(0=0481)
0=1460
(0=0902)
0=1400
(0=0935)
0=1240WWW
(0=0441)
Season 08/09
0=1530WWW
(0=0564)
0=2420WW
(0=1190)
0=2440WW
(0=1220)
0=2110WWW
(0=0524)
Constant
1=7070W
(1=0290)
2=0340WW
(0=9990)
1=5820
(1=0370)
1=4360
(1=0450)
Obs. 906 288 288 906
Pseudo R2 0=0597 0=1143 0=0965 0=0524
Standard errors in parentheses, WWWs?0=01> WWs?0=05> Ws?0=10=
Table 6: Negative binomial regressions for the number of 2 minute
penalties for favorite and underdog and home and away separately.
The full table including variables for spectators, occupancy and
distances between team locations can be found in table A6 in the
appendix. Controls for home teams, visiting teams, referees and
linesmen are included but not reported.
To investigate the last hypothesis H4, we have to look at the eects of seasons
on eort. In all regressions reported in this paper, season 2006/07 is the reference
group. As more games have been played by each team in season 2007/08 than in
the previous one, we expect the respective dummy to be significantly negative.
Our results confirm this expectation of hypothesis H4 which can be seen in tables
3, 4 and 5. We can conclude that, in line with theory, eort declines if the prize
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spread is smaller.
Interestingly, also the dummy for season 2008/09 is negative and significant.
Hence, teams committed less penalties in this season than in season 2006/07 even
though they played an equal number of games and the spread between winner
and loser prize remained unchanged. Only the number of teams changed from
14 to 16 which might have led to a kind of perceived change in the value of each
game. However, we have to be careful as this observation could also indicate that
we observe less penalties over the years in German hockey. We need a broader
database to investigate this eect further.
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5 Conclusion
We have investigated the impact of heterogeneity on eort provision in hockey.
Our results show, that in line with theory, both contestants reduce eort if they
are ex ante more heterogeneous. Hence, if two teams of very dierent ability
compete against each other, we will observe lower eort levels. This observation
holds especially for the favorite.
These observations should have consequences for the design of the premier
hockey league in Germany as well as for any other sports league. As fans like the
tension of a close game, a very intense game will attract more spectators. The
league and the teams are naturally interested in attracting a lot of spectators in
order to increase entrance fee revenues and the value of TV broadcasting rights.
Hence, the league should design games as homogeneous as possible to ensure a
close and interesting contest. To ensure a certain amount of homogeneity the
league can resort to four concrete policies. To equalize the number of players
each team can use in a game, the league should limit the number of players on
the roster. A regular promotion and relegation rule should be implemented so
weak teams drop out and are replaced by the strongest teams from the second
league. Since the dropping out would be costly in terms of lost revenues and
disappointed fans the teams would try hard to avert the relegation and therefore
exert more eort. In addition to limiting the number of players on the roster
the league should try to equalize the quality of the teams, too. By introducing
a salary and, more important, a payroll cap the league can prevent teams from
having highly dierent budgets and therefore highly dierent levels of abilities.
Up to now only the limiting of the roster to 22 players and 2 goalkeepers is
implemented in the German hockey league. Since there have not been enough
teams to fill the designed 18 team spots of the league for over a decade now
(in the last years only 14 to 16 spots were filled), no regular promotion and
relegation takes place. All teams able to meet the financial licence criteria are
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allowed to stay in the premier league. The champion of the second German
hockey league is allowed but not forced to climb even if he satisfies the licence
criteria. Furthermore, the league has not imposed any kind of salary or payroll
cap. Since hockey is a fringe sport in Germany the highest payroll has not
exceeded 8 million Euro in the last years. Nevertheless, the dierences between
the teams’ payrolls are quiet substantial, since e.g. in the season 2007/2008 the
highest payroll was around 50% higher than the second highest. On basis of our
findings a downsizing of the league to e.g. 14 teams, the introduction of a regular
promotion and relegation rule and a restriction of the payrolls seems appropriate.
Furthermore, our analysis has shown that eort declines if the number of
games per team rises and therefore the prize spread declines. The league has
reacted to this phenomenon and has reduced the number of games per team in
season 2008/09. However, even then we observe a lower eort provision than in
the first season. A possible explanation might be that a larger number of teams
in the league leads to a perceived lower value of a single game. This finding
strengthens our earlier proposal to reduce the total number of teams in favor of
using a special round robin tournament to decrease the number of games.
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  1:  AUG
  2:  DEG
  3:  DUI
  4:  EBB
  5:  EHC
  6:  FRA
  7:  HAN
  8:  HHF
  9:  IEC
10:  ING
11:  KAS
12:  KEC
13:  KEV
14:  MAN
15:  SIT
16:  STR
Figure 1: Geographical distrubution of hockey teams in Germany.
For full team names see table A1.
AUG Augsburger Panther IEC Iserlohn Roosters
DEG DEG Metro Stars ING ERC Ingolstadt
DUI Foxes Duisburg KAS Kassel Huskies
EBB Berlin Polar Bears KEC Cologne Sharks
EHC Grizzly Adams Wolfsburg KEV Krefeld Penguins
FRA Frankfurt Lions MAN Mannheim Eagles
HAN Hanover Scorpions SIT Sinupret Ice Tigers
HHF Hamburg Freezers STR Straubing Tigers
Table A1: Names of all teams participating in the German hockey
league in the seasons 2006/2007 to 2008/2009.
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2 Minute Penalties Total (1) First (2) Second (3) Third (4)
Heterogeneity
(di. win. prob.)
0=2020WW
(0=0813)
0=3350WWW
(0=1290)
0=1110
(0=1290)
0=4310WWW
(0=1510)
Goals Home
(after current third)
0=0217WWW
(0=0049)
0=0531WWW
(0=0135)
0=0280WWW
(0=0093)
0=0297WWW
(0=0090)
Goals Visitor
(after current third)
0=0014
(0=0052)
0=0191
(0=0156)
0=0054
(0=0104)
0=0076
(0=0097)
Spectators
(per 1000)
0=0314
(0=0241)
0=0215
(0=0384)
0=0188
(0=0383)
0=0593
(0=0451)
Spectators2
(per 1000)
0=0017
(0=0011)
0=0013
(0=0018)
0=0012
(0=0018)
0=0028
(0=0021)
Occupancy
0=1310
(0=1100)
0=1090
(0=1750)
0=3300W
(0=1740)
0=0864
(0=2050)
Distance between
teams in 100km
0=0053
(0=0072)
0=0029
(0=0115)
0=0135
(0=0115)
0=0035
(0=0136)
Season 07/08
0=1100WWW
(0=0302)
0=1080WW
(0=0480)
0=1060WW
(0=0476)
0=1020W
(0=0564)
Season 08/09
0=1770WWW
(0=0359)
0=1570WWW
(0=0574)
0=1530WWW
(0=0567)
0=2140WWW
(0=0670)
Constant
2=7780WWW
(0=6670)
0=1840
(1=1400)
1=9190
(1=2420)
2=2660W
(1=3660)
Obs. 1197 1197 1197 1197
Pseudo-R2 0=0543 0=0465 0=0470 0=0425
Standard errors in parentheses, WWWs?0=01> WWs?0=05> Ws?0=10=
Table A2: Negative binomial regression for the number of 2minute
penalties in the whole game and each third separately with the
dierence between winning probabilites as heterogeneity measure.
Controls for home teams, visiting teams, referees and linesmen are
included but not reported.
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2 Minute Penalties Second Period (1) Third Period (2)
1 - 2 Goals Dierence
(after previous third)
0=0812WWW
(0=0296)
0=0660
(0=0411)
3 - 4 Goals Dierence
(after previous period)
0=0158
(0=0614)
0=1170WW
(0=0526)
 5 Goals Dierence
(after previous period)
0=2710
(0=2080)
0=2920WWW
(0=0929)
Goals Home
(after current period)
0=0297WWW
(0=0097)
0=0193WW
(0=0095)
Goals Visitor
(after current period)
0=0058
(0=0105)
0=0075
(0=0096)
Spectators
(per 1000)
0=0264
(0=0385)
0=0519
(0=0449)
Spectators2
(per 1000)
0=0015
(0=0018)
0=0026
(0=0021)
Occupancy
0=3160W
(0=1750)
0=0459
(0=2050)
Distance between
teams in 100km
0=0127
(0=0115)
0=0050
(0=0136)
Season 07/08
0=1110WW
(0=0475)
0=109W
0
(0=0562)
Season 08/09
0=1580WWW
(0=0566)
0=2180WWW
(0=0669)
Constant
2=0410W
(1=2390)
2=2220
(1=3640)
Obs. 1197 1197
Pseudo-R2 0=0487 0=0431
Standard errors in parentheses, WWWs?0=01> WWs?0=05> Ws?0=10=
Table A3: Negavite binomial regression with goal dierence as
heterogeneity measure. Controls for home teams, visiting teams,
referees and linesmen are included but not reported.
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2 Minute Penalties Second Period (1) Third Period (2)
Heterogeneity
(di. win. prob.)
0=1190
(0=1290)
0=4400WWW
(0=1510)
1 - 2 Goals Dierence
(after previous third)
0=0820WWW
(0=0296)
0=0698W
(0=0410)
3 - 4 Goals Dierence
after previous third)
0=0153
(0=0613)
0=1270WW
(0=0526)
 5 Goals Dierence
after previous third)
0=2700
(0=2080)
0=2880WWW
(0=0927)
Goals Home
(after current period)
0=0294WWW
(0=0097)
0=0202WW
(0=0095)
Goals Visitor
(after current period)
0=0058
(0=0105)
0=0073
(0=0096)
Spectators
(per 1000)
0=0250
(0=0385)
0=0577
(0=0449)
Spectators2
(per 1000)
0=0014
(0=0018)
0=0028
(0=0021)
Occupancy
0=3210W
(0=1750)
0=0659
(0=2050)
Distance between
teams in 100km
0=0129
(0=0115)
0=0041
(0=0135)
Season 07/08
0=1140WW
(0=0475)
0=1010W
(0=0562)
Season 08/09
0=1580WWW
(0=0566)
0=2210WWW
(0=0668)
Constant
2=0390W
(1=2390)
2=2740W
(1=3630)
Observations 1197 1197
Pseudo-R2 0=0489 0=0446
Standard errors in parentheses, WWWs?0=01> WWs?0=05> Ws?0=10=
Table A4: Negavite binomial regression with dierence between
winning probabilities and goal dierence as heterogeneity mea-
sures. Controls for home teams, visiting teams, referees and lines-
men are included but not reported.
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2 Minute Penalties Favorite (1) Underdog (2)
Heterogeneity
(di. win. prob.)
0=3260WWW
(0=1170)
0=1350
(0=1060)
Goals Favorite
0=0149WW
(0=0065)
0=0020
(0=0068)
Goals Underdog
0=0074
(0=0072)
0=0196WWW
(0=0062)
Spectators
(per 1000)
0=0571WWW
(0=0219)
0=0135
(0=0206)
Spectators2
(per 1000)
0=0026WW
(0=0012)
0=0010
(0=0011)
Occupancy
0=0675
(0=0915)
0=1830WW
(0=0885)
Distance between
teams in 100km
0=0350WWW
(0=0113)
0=0160WW
(0=0081)
Season 07/08
0=0915WW
(0=0408)
0=1170WWW
(0=0385)
Season 08/09
0=1580WWW
(0=0488)
0=2060WWW
(0=0464)
Constant
2=1830WW
(0=8760)
1=9660WW
(0=9010)
Obs. 1194 1194
Pseudo R2 0=0587 0=0558
Standard errors in parentheses, WWWs?0=01> WWs?0=05> Ws?0=10=
Table A5: Negative binomial regression with dierence between
winning probabilities as heterogeneity measure for favorites and
underdogs separately. Controls for home teams, visiting teams,
referees and linesmen are included but not reported..
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Favorite Underdog
2 Minute Penalties Home (1) Visitor (2) Home (3) Visitor (4)
Heterogeneity
(di. win. prob.)
0=2620W
(0=1480)
0=3180
(0=3920)
0=0209
(0=3930)
0=0366
(0=1380)
Goals Home
0=0187WW
(0=0078)
0=0432WWW
(0=0166)
0=0157
(0=0172)
0=0233WWW
(0=0071)
Goals Visitor
0=0011
(0=0086)
0=0038
(0=0143)
0=0098
(0=0148)
0=0063
(0=0079)
Spectators
(per 1000)
0=0697WW
(0=0352)
0=1150
(0=2290)
0=2480
(0=2390)
0=0147
(0=0319)
Spectators2
(per 1000)
0=0031W
(0=0016)
0=0074
(0=0091)
0=0110
(0=0094)
0=0003
(0=0015)
Occupancy
0=1210
(0=166)
0=1030
(0=993)
0=6570
(1=033)
0=1570
(0=152)
Distance between
teams in 100km
0=0071
(0=0117)
0=0302
(0=0219)
0=0238
(0=0226)
0=0025
(0=0108)
Season 07/08
0=0865W
(0=0481)
0=1460
(0=0902)
0=1400
(0=0935)
0=1240WWW
(0=0441)
Season 08/09
0=1530WWW
(0=0564)
0=2420WW
(0=1190)
0=2440WW
(0=1220)
0=2110WWW
(0=0524)
Constant
1=7070W
(1=0290)
2=0340WW
(0=9990)
1=5820
(1=0370)
1=4360
(1=0450)
Obs. 906 288 288 906
Pseudo R2 0=0597 0=1143 0=0965 0=0524
Standard errors in parentheses, WWWs?0=01> WWs?0=05> Ws?0=10=
Table A6: Negative binomial regression for favorite and under-
dog by home and away. Controls for home teams, visiting teams,
referees and linesmen are included but not reported.
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